Security · Guide 4

Phishing, wallet drainers and address poisoning

Most losses are not broken cryptography. They are a correct signature on the wrong transaction, given voluntarily.

Almost nobody loses funds because someone broke the cryptography. They lose them because they signed something, on a real site or a convincing copy, and the signature did exactly what it said.

The domain is the tell

Lookalike addresses are cheap to register and they work. Common patterns: a swapped glyph, an extra hyphen, a different ending, or the real brand used as a subdomain so the start of the string looks right. The part a person reads first is the part the attacker controls.

The defence is not a sharper eye. It is a bookmark: save the sites you use, reach them from the bar, and type the address yourself the first time. Search results and links in messages are untrusted, even when the page looks identical.

Search results are an ad market

Paid placements sit above and among organic results, and a paid placement can point anywhere. Malicious ads impersonating wallet and exchange brands have been a recurring problem for years, because the ad is approved by a machine that checks the landing page, not the wallet flow that comes later.

If you must search, scroll past the ads and check the domain character by character. A first result that is an ad with a slightly wrong domain is not a coincidence.

Fake support arrives first

Real support does not contact you first. It does not ask for your seed phrase, does not ask for remote access, and does not ask you to «validate» or «migrate» a wallet through a page it sends you.

Anyone who opens with urgency, a screenshot of your own transaction and a helpful tone is following a script. Its goal is a page where you type the words or sign. Block, report, and check the official channel yourself.

How a drainer works

A drainer is a page that asks your wallet for permission, and receives it. Three shapes cover most cases.

A token approval. You allow a contract to spend a specific token, sometimes an unlimited amount. The page calls it «enabling» or «verifying». Once granted, the contract can move that token whenever it likes, without asking again.

An approval for everything. For NFT collections and some token standards, one signature can authorise a contract to transfer every item you own in that collection. One click, whole collection.

A permit signature. A newer pattern asks you to sign a message off-chain. It costs no gas, so the wallet may show no fee and the page may describe it as free. It still grants spending rights, and it is the shape people most often mistake for a harmless login.

«Connect» and «sign» are not the same, and neither is a login. A signature is an authorisation with a scope; if you cannot state the scope in one sentence, do not sign.

Reading a request before you approve

Wallets show different amounts of detail, so slow down and use what is there:

  • Which site is asking? The wallet usually shows the origin. Compare it with the bookmark, not with your memory.
  • Which contract? An unknown contract on a familiar site is still an unknown contract.
  • What is the action? A transfer moves funds now. An approval grants future permission. A permit does both without a fee.
  • How much? Exact amounts are better than unlimited. If the interface only offers unlimited, that is a design choice by the site, and you can decline.
  • Which chain? A request on the wrong network is a sign the page is not what it claims.
  • Does the wallet warn you? Modern wallets flag known malicious contracts. A warning is not noise.

If a request arrives by message, from an account you do not know, about a claim you did not expect, the answer is no. There is no exception for a deadline, a «snapshot», or a screenshot of other people claiming successfully.

Address poisoning

A different attack targets your habits rather than your keys. An attacker sends a tiny or zero-value transfer from an address crafted to look like one you use: same first characters, same last characters, different middle. That transaction now appears in your history, and the next time you copy a recipient from history you may copy theirs.

The defences are boring and effective. Never copy an address from transaction history. Use a saved address book, and verify the full string, not the first and last four characters. For large transfers, send a small test amount first.

If you already signed

Act in this order: revoke the approval from a device you trust, move remaining assets to a wallet that was never exposed, and stop using the compromised address. Approvals survive a drain, so a wallet can be emptied again later if the permission is still live. The first-hour guide covers the sequence in detail.

What to do this week

  • Bookmark the three sites you use most, and remove any saved link you cannot explain.
  • Before your next signature, say out loud what it authorises. If you cannot, close the tab.
  • Review your token approvals and revoke the ones you do not recognise.

Next: how approvals accumulate and what a contract can change later, in smart contract and bridge risk, and how to protect the account behind the wallet in exchange accounts and 2FA.