Wallet profile
Ledger: a hardware wallet with a closed firmware
Ledger keeps the key off your computer and inside a secure element. The trade-off is that the device and its firmware are not fully open to inspection.
Ledger's argument is physical. The key is generated and used inside a chip, and the computer or phone only ever receives signatures. That single design decision changes the failure mode: malware on the host can ask for a signature, but it cannot read the phrase, provided the device is genuine and you actually read what its screen says.
- Custody
- Self-custody
- Networks
- Bitcoin, Ethereum, EVM chains, Solana and more
- Platforms
- USB / Bluetooth device + desktop and mobile app
- Open source
- No, closed firmware
- Price
- Paid device
- Backup
- 24-word recovery phrase, optional passphrase
- Official site
- ledger.com
- Checked
- 8 Nov 2026
What it does well
Asset coverage is wide and the companion app does the tedious parts: installing chain applications on the device, showing balances and building transactions. The device works as a signer for third-party wallets too, so MetaMask, Rabby or Sparrow can supply the interface while the key stays in the chip. Bluetooth on some models removes the cable for phone use.
The screen and buttons give you a confirmation step that a browser extension cannot offer, and the passphrase feature creates a hidden wallet whose phrase is never stored on the device. For someone moving a long-term balance off a laptop, that is a substantial change in what a single malware infection can accomplish.
Security model and limits
The firmware is closed, and the secure element is opaque by design. You are trusting the vendor's build process, its key management and its handling of any reported flaw. That trust is not unreasonable, but it is trust, and it cannot be replaced by reading the code.
The screen is a small display, and a small display cannot describe a complex contract call. A transfer shows an address and an amount; an interaction with a contract may be approved with much less context than the transaction deserves, which is the blind-signing problem in its ordinary form. Reading the address in full, character by character, is not paranoia when the alternative is approving a hash.
Two more practical edges: the device is a physical object with a supply chain, so a pre-initialised unit or a resold one is a risk that only buying from the vendor removes; and the vendor's optional recovery subscription stores encrypted shares with third parties after identity checks, which is a real change to the custody model and should be read as one before it is enabled. A wired connection is still a connection: the host proposes, the device confirms.
Who it is not for
Anyone who requires open firmware should not buy it. Nor should someone who will not read the device screen, or who expects the device to explain a contract rather than show a truncated summary.
Official sources
Model specifications, supported assets and the recovery service terms are published on ledger.com. Firmware and the companion app should only come from there.