Beginner · Lesson 4

Wallets, private keys and seed phrases

A wallet holds no coins. It holds the ability to sign. That sentence explains almost every security rule that follows.

Beginner12 min readUpdated 8 Nov 2026

A wallet holds no coins. It holds one secret and the ability to do arithmetic with it. Everything that follows — why a twelve-word backup matters more than the app, why a "restore" works on a new phone, why nobody can help you undo a wrong address — comes from that one sentence.

What is actually stored

A wallet stores a private key: a number so large that guessing it is not realistic. From it the wallet derives a public key, and from that an address. An address is not an account with a balance attached; it is a lock, and the private key is the only thing that opens it.

When you receive crypto, nothing enters your device. The network records that some coins are now spendable by your address, and your wallet needs to be online only to see that record and to sign when you spend. Restoring a backup on a new device shows the same funds because the funds never lived in the old device — only the key did.

From twelve words to every key you own

Typing a list of words into a new wallet is not a password reset. It is a deterministic reconstruction. The words encode a random number, and every key the wallet will ever use is computed from that number by a fixed procedure.

The arithmetic of the backup explains why the length is not arbitrary. A twelve-word phrase encodes 128 bits of randomness plus a 4-bit checksum: 132 bits in total, and since each word carries 11 bits, 132 ÷ 11 = 12 words. A twenty-four-word phrase encodes 256 bits plus an 8-bit checksum: 264 ÷ 11 = 24. The checksum is why a wallet rejects a phrase with one word mistyped — the last word is partly determined by the others.

The derivation step is standardised too. A seed generates a master key, and a derivation path such as m/44'/0'/0'/0/0 selects a branch and an address index. That is why the same twelve words can produce different addresses in two wallets: they followed different paths. It is also why "my funds disappeared after restoring" is usually a path or network problem, not a theft.

The seed phrase is the wallet. A hardware device, a phone app and a desktop program are three different machines reading the same secret. Destroy all three and the funds still exist; destroy the phrase and they are gone. There is no support line, no recovery form and no exception.

Hot, cold, and what the words mean

These terms describe where the private key exists relative to a network-connected machine, not how modern or expensive the product is.

  • Hot wallet: the key lives on a device that is online. Convenient for small amounts and frequent use; the attack surface is the whole device, including every app on it.
  • Cold wallet: the key lives on a device that never connects, and signing happens offline or inside a secure element that releases only a signature. Safe against remote malware; not safe against a backup photographed into a cloud folder.

A cold wallet does not make you careful. The remaining sections are about the ways people are not.

Multisig: when one key is not enough

A multisig address requires m signatures out of n possible keys. With 2-of-3 there are three signing pairs: any two can move funds, one alone cannot. Lose one key and the wallet still works; lose two and it does not.

Treasuries use multisig rather than most individuals because it converts a single point of failure into a policy, at the cost of more backups and a setup you must reproduce years later. A 2-of-3 whose keys all sit in one drawer is a 1-of-1 with extra steps.

The passphrase: a wallet inside a wallet

Most standards allow an optional passphrase on top of the seed words. It is not an app password: it is mixed into the derivation, so a different passphrase produces a different wallet with different addresses. The same twelve words plus another passphrase open an empty-looking wallet.

Two consequences. Forget the passphrase and the funds are as lost as if you had lost the phrase; there is no hint mechanism. But someone who finds your written seed cannot see the protected funds, which is real protection against a physical discovery. Keep the passphrase separately, and accept that losing either half loses everything.

The three ways keys are lost

Loss. A backup that existed in one place, on one device, in one house. Fire, flood, a wiped phone. The fix is redundancy across separate locations, in a form that survives without electricity.

Exposure. The phrase entered into a website that asked for it, stored in a note app that syncs, photographed, or read aloud on a video call. No legitimate service needs your seed words, and no support agent needs remote access to your computer.

Signature. A transaction or token approval signed while believing it did something else. This is what a hardware wallet mitigates: the device displays the destination and the amount, so a compromised computer cannot silently rewrite them.

Two of the three have nothing to do with cryptography. They are operational failures, and they are the ones worth designing against.

Check yourself

  • If a twelve-word phrase encodes 128 bits of randomness and each word carries 11 bits, where do the remaining 4 bits come from, and what are they for?
  • Why can the same seed words generate different addresses in two different wallets?
  • In a 2-of-3 multisig, how many keys can be lost before the funds become unspendable, and how many are needed to spend?

Read Your first operation next for the practical sequence, and Bitcoin and blockchain if the idea of an address as a lock still feels abstract. Terms used here — private key, seed phrase, cold wallet, multisig — are defined in the glossary. Seed phrase protection is the operational side of the same idea: what to do before, not after.