Security · Guide 2

Seed phrase protection: the 12 words that own everything

A seed phrase is not a password: it cannot be reset, changed or recovered by support. Treat it as the deed to the asset.

Twelve words, written in order, are enough to rebuild every private key a wallet will ever produce. That is the design and the problem at the same time: the backup is total, portable and impossible to revoke. Treat the words as the deed to the asset, not as a password you might change later.

What the words actually encode

A seed phrase is a human-readable encoding of a large random number. The BIP-39 standard takes entropy, appends a checksum, and splits the result into 11-bit chunks, each mapped to a word from a fixed list of 2,048. Twelve words carry 128 bits of randomness plus checksum bits, and twenty-four words carry 256. The checksum is why a mistyped word is usually rejected instead of silently opening the wrong wallet.

Two consequences follow. The words are not secret because they are words, but because of the entropy behind them, so «make up your own phrase» is a bad idea. And the same words always produce the same keys, on any compatible wallet, which is what makes recovery possible.

Anyone with the words and the right derivation path has your funds, without your device or your permission.

Offline means offline

Write the words by hand, from the device screen, in order, and check them twice. Do not type them into a computer «to print later». Do not photograph them. The photograph is the leak, because photo libraries sync to cloud accounts by default and cloud accounts are compromised through email, not through cryptography.

There is no clever digital hiding place. A password manager note, an email draft, a message to yourself, an encrypted archive with a password you will forget: each converts a physical secret into an account you can be locked out of, or a file an attacker can copy in a second.

Paper and metal

Paper is cheap, universal and fragile. It survives a drawer and not a flood, it fades, and it is easy to lose in a move. Metal plates survive fire and water, cost real money, and introduce a different problem: a stamped plate is obviously a seed backup.

The trade-off is not «metal is better». It is «which failure am I protecting against». If your risk is fire and flood, metal wins. If your risk is a burglary or a curious housemate, a plate on a shelf is worse than a folded paper in a book. Pick the failure you are actually exposed to, and do not buy a product to avoid thinking about it.

Whatever you use, verify the backup once, because an untested backup is a rumour.

Split backups, and the trap in them

Two full copies in two locations protect against loss. They also double the number of places where a single theft is enough. The alternatives are a deliberate scheme, such as Shamir or a 2-of-3 multisig, where no single location holds enough to spend, or accepting the duplication and hardening both locations.

Improvising is where people fail. «First six words here, last six there» sounds clever until you forget the split, or a burglar finds one half and learns half the secret. If you split, document the scheme separately from the words, and rehearse the reconstruction before you rely on it.

The passphrase

An optional passphrase, sometimes called the twenty-fifth word, is combined with the seed to derive a completely different wallet. A stolen seed without it opens an empty decoy, which is its real value. The cost is steep: there is no checksum, no recovery and no support. A typo silently opens a different empty wallet, and an heir who does not know the passphrase inherits nothing.

If you use one, store it separately from the words, never in the same envelope, and write down the exact spelling and capitalisation.

Never digital, never shared

No photo, no cloud note, no email, no chat, no screenshot, no printer queue, no «wallet validation» website, no remote support session. Any request for the words is an attack, whatever the profile picture, the urgency or the official-sounding domain.

Nobody legitimate needs your seed phrase. Not support, not a wallet update, not a migration, not an airdrop, not a government. The only software that should ever see it is the wallet you chose, at the moment you restore.

Inheritance

The hard part is that your family cannot recover the funds and an attacker with the words can. A workable plan separates the two: instructions in one place that explain what exists and who to contact, the words in another, held by a lawyer, a safe or a multisig co-signer. Rehearse the access path with the person involved, without showing the secret, and recheck it after a move or a change of phone.

What to do this week

  • Find every copy of your seed phrase, including the one you made «just in case» and forgot. Destroy any digital copy today.
  • Restore the backup into a spare wallet and confirm the first address matches, then wipe the spare.
  • Write one page of instructions for one trusted person, sealed, that explains where the backup is without containing the words.

Next: how a device keeps the key out of your computer in hardware wallets, and how the signing setup is organised in wallet security. If you want the theory first, wallets, private keys and seed phrases explains where the key lives before any device touches it.